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Retention of Extensive Powers Not Cause
for Estate Taxation of a Trust
Decedent had placed the stock of three closely held corporations in an
irrevocable trust. He had previously controlled the corporations, and he retained the right to vote the transferred stock, to veto the transfer of any stock
by the trustee, and to remove the trustee and appoint another corporate trustee
as successor. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the
transferred stock was includable in his gross estate under section 2036(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code.' Decedent's executrix paid the additional tax and
brought suit for a refund in federal district court. The court ruled for the
executrix.' The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.! The Supreme
Court granted certiorari.' Held, affirmed: The decedent did not retain the
right, within the meaning of section 2036(a) (2), to designate who was to
enjoy the trust income, and the decedent's voting control of the stock did not
constitute retention of the enjoyment of the transferred stock within the
meaning of section 2036(a) (1), so that the transferred stock was not includable in the gross estate of the decedent. United States v.Byrum, 408 U.S.
125 (1972).
I. THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX

A death tax is the price paid for the privilege of transmitting property at
death, and although the tax is measured by the value of the property transferred
at death, the tax is actually upon the transfer of the property rather than the
property itself.' Death taxes are divided into estate and inheritance taxes, the
former being for the privilege of transferring property and the latter being
for the privilege of receiving property.! The federal tax established by the
Internal Revenue Code is an estate tax. Sections 2036(a) (1) and (2) of
the Code are concerned with reservation of a life interest in the corpus of
transferred property.'
'INT.

REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036.

'Byrum v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
3440 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1971).
,-404 U.S. 937 (1971).

3 (1956).
11d. at 4. The Internal Revenue Code attempts to tax all transfers passing at death regardless of the form in which the transfer is made. The estate tax consequences of transfers
by will and intestacy, dower and curtesy and their statutory substitutes, transfers in contemplation of death, transfers taking effect at death, transfers with a reservation of a life
interest, revocable transfers, annuities, survivorship in joint estates, powers of appointment,
and life insurance are detailed in INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2033-42.
7 Section 2036 provides in part:
(a) General Rule-The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property . . . of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer
...under which he has retained for his life .. .
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom.
Also on point is Rev. Rul. 67-54, 1967-1 CUM. BULL. 269. In a fact situation similar to
Byrum, stock held in trust could not be sold without the consent of the settlor, who retained
the right to vote the stock. The ruling states: "Since the grantor retained the power to regu1 C. LoWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
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Section 2036 (a)(1): Enjoyment of the Property. "Enjoyment" as used in this

subsection denotes a present, substantial economic benefit.8 Many trusts which
are taxed under this subsection involve the retention by the settlor of title,
right to income, or the right to use real property for his lifetime.9 Other reasons
for inclusion of a trust are use of trust income to discharge the obligation of
the settlor to support the beneficiary and retention of an interest in the family
residence given to a spouse.'" However, substance rather than form controls"
so that while the settlor might not retain an interest in the trust instrument,
an understanding, express or implied, that the interest would be conferred
later will cause inclusion of the trust in the estate. 2

Section 2036(a)(2): Right To Designate Income Beneficiaries. Among the

reserved powers causing a trust to be included in the gross estate of a settlor
under section 2036(a) (2) are the powers to shift beneficial interest from one
person to another," to accumulate income in the trust, 4 to withhold or accelerate distribution of principal, 5 to designate whether an extraordinary item is
principal or income," and to terminate the trust."' If the powers of the trustee
may be exercised only with the consent of the settlor the trust may be included in the gross estate.'" However, several cases have indicated that the
retention of certain broad powers by the settlor is not likely to result in the
trust being taxed as part of the estate. The powers include determining inlate the income from the transferred property, he retained for his life or for a period which
did not in fact end before his death the right to designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the property or the income therefrom."
8
Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
"See, e.g., Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Estate of Holland v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 807, modified,
1 T.C. 564 (1943). The rationale of these cases is given in Church: "[A1n estate tax
cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except by a bona fide transfer in which the settlor,
absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations, parts with all of
his title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property." 335
U.S. at 645.
"'Commissioner v. Dwight's Estate, 205 F.2d 298 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 871
(1953); Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1064 (1960). But see Estate of Gutchess
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 554 (1966), in which a residence put in trust for the grantor's
spouse was not includable in the gross estate. See generally Rossbach, Gifts With Retained
Life Estates Including the Use of Property: Income and Estate Tax Consequences, N.Y.U.
25TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1077 (1967).
"See, e.g., Note, Application of Sections 2036(a)(1)-(2) to Transfers in Trust of Stock
in Closely Held Corporations, 46 TUL. L. REV. 1038 (1972).
"Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
829 (1959).
'"Cook v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 660
(1934).
"4 United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966). But see Commissioner v. Estate of
McDermott, 222 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1955). Accumulated income was held not taxable even
though the corpus was taxable.
"Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
16 See, e.g., Estate of Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943); Estate of O'Neal, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
713 (1947). See generally Comment, Inclusion of Trust Corpus in Settlor's Taxable Estate
Where Administrative Powers Are Held in Fiduciary Capacity, 32 RocKY MT. L. REV. 223
(1960).
"See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946); Reinecke v.
Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929).
"SSee, e.g., Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935); Estate of
O'Neal, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 713 (1947) (power to "control" trust investments); Estate
of Downe, 2 T.C. 967 (1943) (power to direct trustee to issue voting proxies, retain, sell,
exchange, invest, and reinvest trust assets).
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vestment of trust assets, determining which charges are against income and
which are against principal, and acting as a trust advisor in a limited capacity."
II. UNITED STATES V. BYRUM

The View of the Court. In its analysis of section 2036(a) (1) the Court
held that the decedent's voting control of the stock did not constitute retention of the enjoyment of the transferred stock within the meaning of this
section since the decedent had irrevocably transferred the title to the stock and
the right to the income." It was argued that this was not a present benefit, but
rather a speculative and contingent one. The Court would have been on much
firmer ground if it had limited its reasoning to the contention that the settlor
did not retain present enjoyment of the property by continuing to work for
the corporations and retaining voting control. To be guaranteed employment
is not unusual for a majority shareholder of a close corporation."' Byrum quite
possibly would have been employed by one or all of the corporations on the
strength of his past employment and retained holdings. His income was based
on services rendered. That is not the type of enjoyment with which the Court
was concerned. Enjoyment, within the meaning of section 2036(a) (1), has
been construed by the courts as involving an incomplete delivery, a revocable
transfer, or a retention of the right to income.2 Only one case2 ' cited by the
Government involved the retention of the right to vote transferred stock, but
it involved a much larger retained interest than did Byrum.' Whether the
right to vote the transferred stock was enjoyment of the property within the
meaning of the statute was a close question. There were no cases directly on
point. The Court reasoned that since there was no precedent for taxing the
estate due to retention of this specific interest, such a precedent should not be
established. Due to the importance of being able to rely on stare decisis,
property law is seldom changed, and the Court reasoned that trusts were
analogous to property in this respect. However, since there was no previous
case law, the Court actually set precedent in Byrum. Therefore, this would
appear to be a very questionable basis for the decision.
The Court concluded that under section 2036(a) (2) retention of broad
management powers would not necessarily subject an inter vivos trust to the
federal estate tax and that the right to vote a majority of the stock in the three
corporations did not give the decedent de facto power to accumulate income
'See, e.g., Estate of King v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 973 (1962); Estate of Peters, 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 994 (1964); Estate of Wurts, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 544 (1960).
""408 U.S. at 132.
2' For a discussion of employment contracts of shareholders in close corporations, see
LAW OF CORPORATIONS 547, 571 (2d ed. 1970).
H. 2HENN,
2
See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969); Lober v. United
States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949);
Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829
(1959).
23
Estate of Holland v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 807 (1942), modified, 1 T.C. 564
(1943).
"The decedent retained a salary for life not related to services rendered but calculated
to provide a 20% return on investments. The decedent also prohibited the beneficiaries from
selling stock. See Ehrlich, Current Developments Involving Non-Voting Stock in Estate
Planning, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1275 (1968).
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in the trust.' The Court cited Reinecke v.Northern Trust Co." and Estate of
King v.Commissioner," although neither was cited as controlling this case.'0
However, probable reliance on these decisions by draftsmen over the years
plus the fact that Northern Trust has never been overruled were convincing
to the Court." It was reasoned that if the law is to be changed it should be
done by Congress rather than by the Courts.'0
A majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty not to misuse his power, and
directors have fiduciary duties to promote the interests of the corporation."'
Thus, itwas argued, the right to control dividends was not legally enforceable.2 The rationale was that there was no predictability of earnings to
accumulate or from which to declare dividends. The precedents relied upon
by the Government-Lober v. United States" and Commissioner v.Estate
of Holmes'-were distinguished as turning on the power to terminate a trust,
which is clearly a different power. Excess accumulation of earnings taxes and
potential shareholders' derivative suits were relied upon as deterrents to any
devices which the settlor might have employed to designate the income beneficiaries through manipulation of dividends. The faith given to the power of
these deterrent forces was a weak link in the Court's reasoning.'0
The Dissenting View. When faced with the issue of enjoyment of the transferred stock within the meaning of section 2036(a) (1), the dissent focused
on the vague term "control." The dissent argued that by retaining control
Byrum guaranteed his own employment and the right to determine if the
corporations should be liquidated or merged. Thus the decedent controlled
a close corporation for his lifetime, which was characterized as a substantial,
present economic benefit." The dissent did not define control.' Even if this
2 408 U.S. at 139-44.
28278 U.S. 339 (1929).
2737

T.C. 973 (1962).

28Northern Trust was not decided under § 2036 or its predecessor, and King was a tax

court decision.
29 "The holding of Northern Trust, that the settlor of a trust may retain broad
powers
of management without adverse estate tax consequences may have been relied upon in the
drafting of hundreds of inter vivos trusts." 408 U.S. at 134.
20 The argument was that Congress can better determine the precise type of conduct which
results in tax consequences, and congressional action will give taxpayers advance warning.
5t
See H. HENN, LAW OP CORPORATIONS 416 (2d ed. 1970).
22408 U.S. at 137.
"'The Court listed reasons why a corporation might not have earnings: bad years,
product obsolescence, new competition, disastrous litigation, new regulations. Further, a close
corporation has less access to capital and may need to be more conservative than a large
corporation in its dividend policy. It may have to plow earnings back into the corporation
rather than using them as a source of dividends. 408 U.S. at 139.
"346 U.S. 335 (1953).

s326 U.S. 480 (1946).
,As the dissent explained, there are penalty taxes for excess accumulation of earnings,
but the penalty takes effect only when accumulations exceed $100,000. INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 531. This would have been little restraint on the settlor's control of dividend policy.
Further, the threat of a shareholder's derivative suit would have been only a slight deterrent
to accumulation of earnings since few such suits succeed. See W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1587 (4th ed. 1969).
2 408 U.S. at 152 (White, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
28 Id. It should be noted that the Government did not rely on any definitions of control
such as that in Treas. Reg. S 1.351-1 (1971). It reads in part: "To be in control of the
transferee corporation, such person or persons must own immediately after the transfer stock
possessing at least 80 per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of
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vague term is to be accepted as the standard for determining taxability of the
trust, a distinction should have been made between the corporation in which
Byrum controlled a majority of the shares in any case, and the corporations
in which he retained control of a majority of the shares only if he had the
power to vote the transferred shares. The dissent did not consider this possibility. The definition of "control" was far less specific than the meanings given
to "enjoyment" as used in section 2036(a) (1) by the courts." Consequently,
the argument of the dissent was weakened by its failure to adequately define
"control."
The dissent relied primarily upon the contention that since the settlor retained the right to vote a majority of the shares in all three corporations he
retained de facto control over corporate dividend policy. Control over dividend
policy allowed the settlor to shift income from the life estate to the remainder
by retaining earnings rather than declaring dividends. This was equated with
the power to accumulate income in the trust,' which in turn constituted the
power to designate beneficiaries. To accept the conclusion of the dissent, one
must first accept its premise that the right to vote a majority of the shares
was equivalent to control over corporate dividend policy.41
III. CONCLUSION

The powers which a settlor of an irrevocable trust may retain without
making the trust includable in his gross estate have been greatly expanded
by Byrum. Even a narrow construction of the holding would allow retention
of broad management powers including the right to vote transferred stock.
Further, the Court indicated an intention to preserve the status quo by not
including a trust in the grantor's gross estate for tax purposes if the retained
powers had not previously been held to have constituted retention of a life
interest. This leaves quite a loophole for tax-conscious settlors. It will be
necessary for Congress to eliminate the loophole through legislation, if the
congressional intent is to tax this type of trust. Since Congress did not move
swiftly to change the law it may be that it approves of the loophole. Congress
might also wish to define more clearly the terms "designation of the persons
who shall possess or enjoy" and "possession or enjoyment," since under the
present interpretation it is apparent that the Government is losing revenue.'"
M. Louise Everett
stock .... The accounting standard of 20% ownership constituting control was also not
considered. 1 APB ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 5 5131.17 (1971).
o"See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
40"Thus, by instructing the directors he elected in the controlled corporations that he
thought dividends should or should not be declared Byrum was able to open or close the
spigot through which income flowed to the trust's life tenants." 408 U.S. at 152.
41 See note 7 supra. The dissent relied upon Rev. Rul. 67-54, while the majority ignored
it. However, a revenue ruling is merely a statement of the position of the Government and
does not have the force of law.
' A month after Byrum was decided it was relied on by a lower court in a case involving
§ 2036(a) (2). The grantor retained the right to direct investments in conjunction with
the trustees. The court held that he did not retain the right to designate persons who shall
possess or enjoy property or its income. Estate of Chalmers, CCH TAX CT. REP. Dec. 31, 473(m) (July 27, 1972).

